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1Abstract
This paper analyses the syndication behavior of VC organisations and the factors
in°uencing their overall propensity to co-invest. We develop hypothesis concern-
ing the investment behavior of Venture Capitalists in the German market and
compare these hypothesis to the actual empirical evidence from a data set in-
cluding 2,500 VC investments. We ¯nd that the underlying theories of ¯nancial
and resource driven motives can indeed be used to explain the observed behav-
ior for syndicated venture capital investments. We show that mainly Resource
driven motives foster the propensity to syndicate an investment. Additionally,
we ¯nd that Venture Capital Firms tend to diversify their portfolio, such that
both motives of venture capital syndication (Finance and Resource driven) seem
to be present at the same time and play a signi¯cant role simultaneously for the
decision to jointly co-invest. We ¯nd evidence that a lower level of experience
and expertise fosters the need to syndicate an investment.
JEL Classi¯cation: G 24, G 31
2Introduction
Venture Firms play a crucial role in providing growth capital to young and in-
novative entrepreneurial ¯rms. Besides the pure support via capital they o®er
additional help by yielding managerial expertise and help to their portfolio ¯rms.
Because of the important role that Venture Capital plays in ensuring success
of their portfolio companies in the aftermath of the investment decision a vast
amount of literature studies the functioning of the Venture Capital Industry. Re-
searchers have analysed the market on multiple dimensions. In particular the role
of Venture Capital in spurring employment and earnings growth is a decisive fea-
ture. Lately, there is a number of studies dealing with the role of Venture Capital
Syndication, trying to investigate the reasons behind the formation of such syn-
dicates and estimating the e®ect that cooperation of ¯nancial institutions might
have on the value and prospects of the funded portfolio company.
This paper extends the empirical literature on Venture Capital Syndication along
two dimensions. Firstly, we analyze the reasons behind the syndication practice
using outcome data in order to draw conclusions from the observable behaviour of
market participants by employing a unique dataset of some 2,500 Venture Capital
Deals in Germany. Secondly, we also investigate the role of di®ering motives for
syndication and disentangle the competing views. The goal of the paper is to
better understand the role of syndicate formation in the process of providing
growth capital to entrepreneurial ¯rms.
One of the di±culties in testing the explanatory power is to be able to make
inferences about the motives separately to see whether they o®er insights into
the behavior of market participants. Thus, we treat the di®ering and competing
views of Venture Capital Syndication as being not mutually exclusive. As such we
test the explanatory power of the diversi¯cation motive along with the resource
driven motive in order to see whether VC ¯rms make use of several dimensions
of portfolio choice when undertaking an investment.
This paper uses a unique dataset on Venture Capital investments in Germany
that allows us to identify the parties involved in a number of transactions. We
can observe for each investee company the VC ¯rms that have invested over
time and can therefore make inferences about their propensity to syndicate. As
such we are also able to see which player syndicates with whom and how often.
For each transaction we have identi¯ed characteristics about both sides of the
involved partners, i.e. Firm characteristics for the VC ¯rms along details of the
investment target, to be able to draw conclusions on two dimensions.
We ¯nd that the resource motive explains the bevavior of market contestants in
Germany, but additionally we come to the conclusion that VC ¯rms also opt to
diversify their portfolio, so that taken together both motives likewise can yield
3insights into the investment decision and syndication formation process of Venture
¯rms. Moreover, we show that we need to make inferences taking both motives
into consideration at the same time.
We start by documenting how the characteristics of the investee company a®ect
the decision made by the VC providers to jointly provide capital. We come to
the conclusion that industry characteristics drive the propensity to syndicate an
investment. Consequently, we ¯nd that the more mature industries exhibit a
much lower level of syndication. However, for the Biotech industry we ¯nd that
possibly due to the distinct particularities and the greater challenges faced in
terms of industry expertise, VC ¯rms are much more inclined to co-invest with a
much larger number of partners.
Additionally, we also investigate the °ipside of the investment decision by analysing
the syndication behavior of di®erent VC companies taking into consideration their
level of experience and their a±liation background. Here we come to the con-
clusion that experience matters to the extent that more mature and experienced
players syndicate much less that their inexperienced counterparts. This result is
strong with respect to the behavior of foreign Venture Capitalists along with One
Time Investors.
In the second part of the paper we show that there is a need to distinguish between
two di®erent perspectives on VC syndication behavior. Syndication per se can not
be associated with a pure diversi¯cation strategy. Diversi¯cation only comes into
play when the VC ¯rm also chooses to build up a new partnership. Moreover, in
order to be able to actually achieve such diversi¯cation bene¯ts from syndication
the VC has to involve a number of new partners into his existing network in order
to be able to gain a signi¯cant e®ect on the portfolio. Or putting it di®erently,
joining an already successful syndicate to take the route to a new industry for
which the VC does not possess the skills to survive. Thus, the option to diversify
is driven by syndicating with a number of new partners in an industry outside of
the predominant industry focus of the investment portfolio in place. We therefore
suggest that syndication is used as a tool to strengthen focus on core industries,
whereas syndication with a larger number of new co-investors or the decision
to join a new syndicate can achieve substantial diversi¯cation bene¯ts for the
portfolio and open up potential for new business.
This paper extends the empirical literature on Venture Capital by shedding light
on the Syndication behavior of market participants. Instead of focusing on ques-
tionnaire data we use a unique hand collected dataset of actual deals to make
inferences. As such our results di®er from other studies focusing on the European
and in particular the German VC market as we ¯nd evidence on both resource
and diversi¯cation reasons that can explain the syndication practice among Ven-
ture Capitalists. Using outcome data we stress the fact that the resource driven
motive and the diversi¯cation motive of syndication are not mutually exclusive
4and need to be taken into account simultaneously to deepen our understanding
of Venture Capital Syndication.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the par-
ticularities of Venture Capital investments and introduces the competing views
on Venture Capital Syndication. Section 2 describes the dataset and the sam-
ple characteristics. Section 3 presents the empirical ¯ndings on the syndication
behavior along with the corresponding interpretations. Section 4 concludes.
1 Syndication Motives: Mutually exclusive or
Complementary?
The principle of venture capital is to provide high potential growth companies
with the required funds and market expertise they need to make their business
model a success. Venture capitalists strive for substantial capital gains and re-
turns in the medium or sometimes long term, compensating them for the high
risk and uncertainty [Sahlmann (1990)]. The ability to select investment oppor-
tunities from a wide range of expected returns is vital to any venture capital
organisation. Di®erent to other institutional investors, venture capitalists face
an informational disadvantage as they do not invest in public quoted companies
[Fama (1991)]. With regard to deal selection and monitoring, venture capital
¯rms have developed di®erent strategies to reduce uncertainty in their high risk
environment. Among these strategies staging of Venture Capital is a common
mean to react to an uncertain environment. Moreover in recent years VC com-
panies have been striving to syndicate investments with other venture capitalists
[Manigart et al. (2002), Wright and Robbie (1998)].
Lerner (1994) points out, that cooperation among ¯nancial institutions is an
enduring feature of the equity issuance process. An equity syndicate involves
several venture capitalists taking an equity stake in an investment [Lockett and
Wright (2001)]. It involves "[...] a group of individuals who must make a
common decision under uncertainty that will result in a payo® to be shared jointly
among them" [Wilson (1968), p. 119]. There exist two dominant competing views
as to why venture capitalists syndicate, which are the traditional ¯nance-related
perspective and the resource-based perspective. All rationalees are described
from a perspective to syndicate out an investment. Lockett and Wright (1999)
¯nd that the motivation to join a syndicate is explained by the same factors to
syndicate out an investment: the risk-mitigating perspective and the resource-
based perspective.
The Risk Mitigating Perspective is to see syndication as a mean for venture cap-
italists to build up a well-diversi¯ed portfolio and reduce risk without reducing
5return. The relevant risk-consideration for a VC investor is the contribution of an
investment to the overall risk of his portfolio. This depends on the covariance of
the portfolio and the investment opportunity. There are two subdivisions of risk
involved in an equity investment. While the market component is systematic and
cannot be eliminated, the ¯rm speci¯c risk component is non-systematic and can
therefore be reduced by holding a well-diversi¯ed portfolio. In a well-balanced
VC portfolio there exists a minimum level of co-variance between the di®erent in-
vestments [Manigart at al. (2002), Lockett and Wright (2001), Markowitz (1959)].
The constraints on investment activities are based on Modern Portfolio The-
ory. Its main principle is the e±cient diversi¯cation of investments ([Elton and
Gruber (1995)]. Firstly, venture capitalists encounter the di±culty to obtain a
well-diversi¯ed portfolio, since they do not invest in listed stocks as institutional
investors. The di±culty arises on the one hand from ex-ante asymmetric infor-
mation and also from the size of the funds required (capital restraints). This
demonstrates that through syndication smaller venture capitalist can actually
invest in deals with a high amount of required funds.
The resource-based approach, however, sees the VC market as a pool of produc-
tive resources in which a VC organisation can access resources of another venture
capitalist through syndication [Manigart et al. (2002), Bygrave (1987)].
At the pre-investment stage, Lerner (1994) suggests the Selection Hypothesis as
a rationale for VC syndication. Under this hypothesis the evaluation process
before the selection of an investment opportunity is undertaken by more than
one venture capitalist. The evaluation of the same venture proposal by di®erent
VC companies operating in a syndicate reduces therefore the potential danger
of adverse selection [Lerner (1994) and Houben (2002)]. The combined e®ort
to assess the quality of a venture helps VC investors to overcome informational
asymmetries as the entrepreneurs typically know more about the investment op-
portunity they seek funding for and might overstate the attractiveness of his
business proposal [Sorenson and Stuart (1999)]. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) compare
the decision-making process under di®erent scenarios: In the ¯rst scenario the
project is already accepted when a single party thinks that it is worth under-
taking. In the second scenario, however, two or more separate parties must be
convinced by the investment opportunity before the project is undertaken. Sah
and Stiglitz (1986) conclude that the decision making process is more e±cient
and leads to better results if the project is only undertaken when approved by
two or more parties.
The Value Added Hypothesis in terms of managerial activities is a resource-based
motive for syndication which holds for the post-investment stage. Under the Value
Added Hypothesis venture capitalists are considered to add value to the perfor-
6mance of the venture after they invested their capital. This contrasts with the
selection hypothesis, where syndication helps investors to select the best projects,
but does not in°uence the performance of the investee company (Brander (et al.
2002)). A lead investor acts according to the Value Added Hypothesis when he
believes that the involvement of other venture capitalists would add some value
to the venture. The bene¯t of involving co-investors is derived from heteroge-
neous skills and information di®erent venture capitalists can contribute to the
management of the venture company. The need for such additional resources is
anticipated to be greater in earlier stages of an investment, than in later-stage
investments. This is mainly due to the fact that more mature investee-companies
already have an established management structure and market position and have
already built relationships with suppliers and customers [Lockett and Wright
(1999), Brander et al. (2002)].
Considering the possibility that both motives and hypothesis could operate at
the same time it could be assumed that "Syndication is a response to the need to
share informational resources in the ex ante selection and ex post management
of investments."(Lockett and Wright (1999), p. 307).
The literature so far, has seen both, the risk mitigating perspective and the
resource based rationale as mutually exclusive. We, however, argue that both
motive could be present at the same and shall be considered simultaneously in
order to be able to shed light on the syndication behavior of venture capital in-
vestors. The scope of the upcoming analysis is therefore on disentangling the
driving forces of Venture Capital Syndication. Having in mind that risk mitigat-
ing and resource motive might well complement each other and need not be seen
as strategic substitutes in the tool box of a VC company we will investigate fur-
ther to which extent the di®erent motives might a®ect the decision to syndicate
a deal. The goal of the forthcoming sections therefore is to reveal the mechanics
and motives that foster the propensity to syndicate and to show based on actual
outcome date the explanatory power of di®ering theoretical arguments on how
and why Venture Capitalist syndicate.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 The VC Investment Sample
The sample consists of Venture Capital transactions in Germany within the period
1996 - 2005. The transactions have been compiled by using public sources and the
Thomson Venture Economics (TVE) Database. We have identi¯ed the involved
parties in each transaction and the corresponding information on the Venture
7Capitalist along with the funded ¯rms. In order to obtain transactions beyond
those covered by TVE for our sample we ¯gured out publicly available information
on venture capital companies and scanned the news for disclosures regarding deals
and associated information. As such we have identi¯ed the funded ¯rms and the
corresponding companies that injected capital. The result was a deal survey
exhibiting who has funded a new company and was joined by which partner.
In addition we supplemented the database with information regarding the VC
¯rms and the funded ¯rms in terms of size, age, industry active in, along with
information speci¯c on the actual deal, such as the stake actually acquired by the
VC ¯rm (in percentage of the ¯rm¶s equity).
Information about the size of the funded ¯rm, measured in terms of sales and
employees, have been collected from the Markus and Amadeus Balance Sheet
Databases and have been combined with publicly available information from cor-
porate websites.
We have used the information from TVE to identify the sector of a particular
venture. Here we make use of the Venture Economics Industry Classi¯cation
(VEIC) - a Venture Economics proprietary industry classi¯cation scheme. More-
over, we reviewed relevant information about the Company Business Description
from the VE database and from the Balance Sheet databases. In order to draw
more distinct conclusions we have further separated the industries in our sample
to result in ¯ner industry clusters. As such we have devided the Medical/Health
classi¯cation in two separate categories. Moreover, we split the Industrial Sector
into Industrial Products (such as Chemicals and Industrial Equipment) and In-
dustrial Services (such as Transportation, Logistics and Manufacturing Services).
In addition we created categories for Software and Internet Firms to cope with
the particularities of investment into "New Economy" Firms over the period. Ta-
ble 1 gives an overview about the investment targets and also reports the number
of investors per funded ¯rm. This number simply calculates how many di®erent
investors a company has. A number of four means that the company is funded
by a co-investment of four di®erent VC providers, for example.
8Table 1:
Firm Characteristics: Descriptive Statistics for Funded Firms
Observations Syndicated? Average #
Yes No Investors
Whole Sample 2474 1461 1013 4.21
Biotech 478 387 91 6.11
Consulting/Services 168 77 91 2.22
Consumer Products 45 22 23 2.68
Electronics 242 139 103 3.39
Utilities 26 14 12 4.14
Financial Institution 41 11 30 2.18
Industrial Products 218 68 150 2.74
Industrial Services 63 26 37 3.62
Internet/E-Commerce 325 214 111 3.61
Life Science/Pharma 105 70 35 7.19
Medical Products 100 58 42 3.71
Media/Communications 140 60 80 2.63
Software 523 315 208 3.43
The table indicates that roughly 60% of the deals have been syndicated and that
the syndication behavior seems to be more pronounced for industries such as
Biotech and Pharma, as well as for Internet and Software ¯rms. Moreover, we
can see that the number of investors per funded company di®ers widely across
industries. Pharma and Biotech ¯rms rank top with some 7 and 6 investors on
average, whereas Consulting and Financial Firms exhibit the lowest number of
investors per deal.
2.2 Additional VC characteristics
Based on the information identi¯ed in the TVE database and the industry clas-
si¯cations we have further collected information out the funded companies to
investigate which factors play a decisive role in explaining the syndication be-
havior. As pointed out in Bygrave (1987) younger ¯rms are more likely to fail
and as such ¯rm age at investment can serve as a proxy for the riskiness of a
venture. Consequently, we have gathered data about the ¯rms founding date and
combined those information with the investment date to arrive at the age of the
funded ¯rm at the date of the capital infusion. Moreover, according to Lockett
and Wright (1999) size variables play an important role for the decision to syn-
dicate an investment, when VC ¯rms want to avoid clustering risks or when the
¯rm is simply to large for the corresponding VC ¯rm. Therefore we have com-
bined the information on age at investment with the ¯rm sales and employees at
9investment date. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the sub sample of
¯rms for which we were able to obtain information about age and size measured
in terms of sales and employees (The age variable was available for 925 deals,
however for the sake of simplicity we only report summary statistics for deals
where information was available for age, sales and employees simultaneously)
Table 2 indicates that information was available for 278 among which 30% were
syndicated. Among the industries we can see that funded ¯rms in the Industrial
Products sector di®er in terms of age at investment and the number of employ-
ees. Firms that have been funded by only a single party have a larger number
of employees and are older on average (di®erences are signi¯cant on the 1% and
5% level, respectively). The same holds for ¯rms within the Media and Com-
munication Sector, where ¯rms funded by a single party are younger on average,
employee more people and exhibit a lower level of sales. In addition, ¯rms in
the Electronics sector that have been funded by more than one party are of the
same age at the investment date as their non-syndicated counterparts, exhibit,
however, a lower level of employees and sales. As a consequence of the inclusion
of additional variables, we experienced a reduction in available data points. As
such, we will in section 3 make inferences from all datasets, that is, we will run
separate regressions making use of the di®erent variables collected.
2.3 VC Characteristics
In addition to shedding light on the syndication behavior by including variables
of the funded ¯rms, we have also included the characteristics of the VC providers
to see how those factors impact the decision to syndicate. According to Tykvova
(2004) VC a±liation plays an important role in explaining syndication behavior
and Brander et al. (2002) ¯nd support for the view that VC experience and
expertise drives the decision to syndicate an investment. To re°ect those ¯ndings
in our analysis we have devided the sample of VC ¯rms into categories re°ecting
the a±liation of each investment company. We classify the companies as being
an independent Venture Capitalist if there are no strings to other ¯rms or banks
attached. Secondly, we classify VC`s as banking dependent when they have been
set up by a private bank or a private bank holds more than 50% of the shares.
Thirdly, we classify a VC as public if the shares are hold by either the German
government or one of the German public banking associations, i.e. Sparkassen or
Landesbanken. Moreover, we included Co-Operative VC¶s if they are associated
with one of the so called Volksbanken in Germany. Additionally, we have sepa-
rated Business Angels and Corporate VC¶s, with Business Angels being one time
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11investee company has been set up by a larger corporation in a spin o®, for exam-
ple. The last category in the dataset are foreign investors, if the VC comes from
a foreign origin and did not operate from a German branch. Table 3 reports that
most of the VC¶s in our sample are foreign and independent investors. However,
the largest amount of deals on average has been undertaken by Banking a±liated
investors and independent VC ¯rms. For further analysis we also describe the
investor companies by their Syndication Ratio. The syndication ratio describes
the propensity to syndicate of the VC investors in the sample. The propensity
of an investor to co-invest is expressed in this paper by its ratio of syndicated
investments to the total number of deals undertaken. The higher the Syndication
Ratio of an investor, the more he tends to invest in portfolio companies that are
funded through a co-investment. A syndication ratio of "0" indicates that the
speci¯c investor invested exclusively on his own and was not involved in any co-
investment of the sample. The syndication ratio is highest for Banking, Foreign
and Corporate VCs. As the syndication ratio might be biased towards one time
investors (with a syndication ratio of "1" or "0"), we have mitigated this problem
by either excluding those investors with only one investment or those transactions
with non-syndicated companies, depending on the particular problem set during
the inductive statistical analyses later in the text.
In a second step we have also divided the venture capital sample into size cat-
egories to later on test the relationships and syndication behavior with respect
to those size categories. Here we are referring to one time investors (apparently,
those ¯rms only involved in a single transaction), small VC¶s that were involved
in 2-4 investment, medium sized VC`s that were undertaking 5-9 transactions,
large VC¶s who participate in 10-29 and lastly very large investors that were in-
volved in 30 to a top of 104 transactions. The summary statistic are not reported
here.
In order to draw better conclusions about the investment behavior we have in-
cluded variables describing the VC investors further. TVE provides informa-
tion about Capital under Management ("Cap") for the VC ¯rms, along with
information on the overall sum invested in Germany ("German Sum") and the
German investment size as a percentage of the overall investment activity world-
wide ("German Perc."). From table 3 we can infer that Foreign and Banking
VCs have the largest amount of Capital under Management measured in Million
USD. Moreover, Independent and Banking VCs invested the largest amount of
capital in Germany, and also invested (along with Public investors) the largest
chunk of their funds into the German market.
In addition, TVE provides information about the investment focus for the various




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13Medical/Health and Pharmaceutical companies, Information Technology or Non-
High ¯rms. The distribution of the data reveals that Independent and Foreign
investors comprise the largest amounts of focussed ¯rms in all three segments.
The statements resulting from the statistical analysis of the 2.474 transactions
have to be made with a note of caution: The data set provides limited informa-
tion as to how many ¯nancing rounds each of the 1486 portfolio companies had
or which investor joined the investment at what time. Information about the
staging of investments is available for a subset of investments, but for the sake
of consistency we have abstained from only looking at deals where information
about the staged nature is available. This in fact, would have reduced our sample
substantially, resulting in less meaningful results. From the number of transac-
tions in the data set a portfolio company is involved in, one can only conclude on
the total number of investors that invested in it during its life span. Thus, it may
well be that there are investors who did fund an investee company during the
¯rst ¯nancing rounds on their own and not through a syndicate. However, if this
investee company gets funded by more investors at later stages, who might even
replace the original investor, it is recorded in the data set as being a syndicated
company because it appears in two or more transactions with two or more dif-
ferent investors. However, we ¯nd the use of a broader de¯nition of syndication
justi¯ed by the strategies underlying the syndication behavior. Syndication can
take place when two or more investors provide capital infusions over time. There
is no urgent need to invest simultaneously and having another investor injecting
capital in a later round can well ¯t into a prede¯ned investment strategy. As such,
investors can focus on earlier rounds and on the same token involve investors with
a late stage focus, for a multitude of reasons ranging from diversi¯cation bene¯ts
to adding complementary resources. Consequently, we make use of a broader
de¯nition of venture capital syndication in our paper. Here, syndication takes
place when more than one VC ¯rm has provided capital over the life time of
the funded ¯rm. With regards to the Syndication Ratio of the overall sample
the very correct interpretation is that the VC investors were at 60% invested in
portfolio companies that have had more than one investor since their foundation.
The analyses in this paper are therefore carried out on the basis of the broader
de¯nition of syndication and come to valuable ¯ndings on syndication patterns
in Germany.
3 Empirical Evidence on Venture Capital Syn-
dication
In the last Paragraphs we have laid out the likely motives that foster a ¯rms
propensity to syndicate an investment. However, the resource and ¯nancial mo-
14tive seem to be mutually exclusive, whereas for more established markets such as
the US the resource driven motives dominate. Moreover, the study undertaken
by Manigart et al. (2002) suggest that in a European context venture capital-
ists are solely focusing on ¯nancial motives such as diversi¯cation arguments to
build there portfolio and thus neglect the value added bene¯t of partner involve-
ment. A recent paper my Fluck, Garrison and Myers (2005), however, stresses
the value added e®ect of syndication patterns in Venture Capital ¯nancing. They
present a model of venture capital contracting that incorporates moral hazard,
and asymmetric information problems and show that later stage syndication of
venture capital investments alleviates the agency problems between the venture
capitalist and the entrepreneur. Syndication thus reduces the monopoly power
of the ¯nancing ¯rm and induces the entrepreneur to put in more e®ort, which
consequently bene¯ts the venture capital provider due to the increased value of
the venture. Fluck et al point out that the commitment to syndicate can protect
the entrepreneur from dilution and thus mitigates the problem of hold-up. The
commitment to syndicate therefore assures a higher e®ort of the entrepreneur
and yields more favourable ¯nancing terms in return.
It has been pointed out that the very true nature of the venture capital indus-
try involving high levels of uncertainty and the trade o® between large upside
potential and low probability of successes fosters the need for higher levels of
partner involvement to overcome informational asymmetries and to bene¯t in-
vestee companies from a combined pool of heterogenous skills. As such we will
in the following analyse the motives behind the syndication patterns observed in
the German Venture Capital market.
3.1 Firm Characteristics and The Impact on Syndication
Patterns
The literature o®ers several explanations as to why VC companies form syndicates
to fund investment targets. Bygrave (1987) found that there is more co-investing
when there is a higher level of uncertainty. His comparison of the more con-
servative consumer and the more risky computer industry in the USA showed a
clear tendency of co-investing in the high innovative computer sector. There was
also more syndication in early-stage investments than later-stage investments,
even though the investment amount required was on average 40% lower for early-
stage investments. Thus, Bygrave (1987) concluded that the main motive for
syndication was rather the sharing of experience and other intangible resources
than capital restraints and the spreading of ¯nancial risk. In his ¯ndings he also
refers to Pfe®er and Salancik (1978) who found similar evidence in their studies
on joint ventures. In another publication, Bygrave and Timmons (1992) again
emphasise the great role uncertainty plays in the decision to syndicate which can
15be reduced by the sharing of information and the access to resources from the
syndicate members.
Chiplin et al. (1997) found greater support for syndication as a mean to improve
deal selection through joint decision making. They acknowledge the importance
of costs in the VC market, but can only ¯nd weak support for the risk sharing
perspective as a motive to syndicate. Contrary to this, Lockett and Wright (1999)
¯nd that the large size of a deal compared to the funds that are available to a
single venture capitalist is signi¯cantly more important than all other factors.
The need for additional information before making a decision turned out to be
the least relevant explaining factor.
In the following we will investigate whether there is a relationship between the
riskiness of a company or an industry on the propensity to syndicate an invest-
ment. The Risk mitigating perspective expects VC¶s to jointly invest in ¯rms
exhibiting a much higher risk. So instead of the risk taken on by a single venture
capitalist it would be necessary to spread the risk associated with an investment
among a group of venture capitalist. However, once VC¶s want to bene¯t from
the upside potential of investee ¯rms and keeping in mind that most of the ¯rms
are very familiar with taken on additional risk that is rewarded later on, we could
likewise expect not to see much explanatory power of ¯rm characteristics on the
level of syndication and that the propensity to syndicate originates more from
the VC¶s side and their corresponding levels of experience and skill set.
Hypothesis 1: A higher ¯rm risk increases the likelihood of an investment being
syndicated
The ¯rst hypothesis to be tested is whether there is a relationship between a
higher ¯rm risk and the likelihood of an investment being syndicated. The cor-
responding dependent variable therefore is simply a zero/one variable indicating
whether a speci¯c deal has been syndicated (1) or not (0). In order to see whether
there might be substantial di®erences in the corresponding industries we have also
included dummy variables indicating whether a speci¯c ¯rm was in a particular




Age The variable Age measures the age of the investee company at the
investment date. Age should proxy for the riskiness of the company
as younger companies usually exhibit a higher rate of failure
Employees at Inv. States the number of people employed at the
investee companies at investment date.
The Variable enters as the log of Employees.
Sales at Inv. To Proxy for ¯rm size we have included the total number of sales
at investment date. The Variable also enters the regression as
the log of sales at investment
Av. Employees Employees states the average number of people employed at the
investee companies for the period 1999-2004. Data prior to 1999
was not available. Variable enter as the log of Employees.
Av. Sales To Proxy for ¯rm size we have included the total number of sales.
The Sales ¯gure is also measured as an average over the
period 1999-2004 and enters the regression as the log of sales.
Industry Dummies In order to control for industry particularities we have included an
Industry Dummy, that takes on the value 1 if the ¯rm is in a
particular industry and zero otherwise. The industries included are
shown in table 2 and have been obtained from the company
description on the website and Markus/Amadeus Database.
In order to see whether a higher degree of co-investing in riskier industries can
be con¯rmed with the database, a multivariate logit model is run with the Syn-
dication variable as the dependent variable and the investee company speci¯c
information along with industry dummies as the explaining variables. The model
speci¯cation is as follows.
y(SY NDICATION) = f(AGE ;EMP ;AEMP ;SALES ;ASALES ;Industry Dummy)+²i
(1)
The results indicate that none of the size categories has a signi¯cant e®ect on
the propensity to syndicate an investment. The Biotech dummy is signi¯cant
at the 5% level in the ¯rst regression using the full dataset, indicating that the
particularities within the riskier Biotech industry play a role for venture capital
¯rms in deciding whether or not to make use of a partner. Additionally, we ¯nd
in regression 2 that the age of the funded ¯rm has a signi¯cant negative e®ect (at
the 5% level) on the propensity to syndicate. This is in line with the ¯ndings of
Bygrave (1987), that younger and more riskier companies call for a higher level of
syndication. The point is further stressed by the fact that more established and
mature industries such as Industrial Products and Services, along with Financial
Institutions exhibit a much lower level of syndication activity (at the 5% level).
17The signi¯cant impact for Industrial Products and Services can also be found in
the last regression speci¯cation. Interestingly, none of the other variables has a
signi¯cant e®ect on the likelihood of an investment being syndicated. Firm risk
as measured by age does not appear to have an e®ect such that spreading of risk
does not seem to drive the syndication behavior. The same holds for the size
measures included. Although larger companies would require VC ¯rms to take a
much higher exposure when acquiring a sizeable equity stake, there does not seem
to be any support for syndication behavior from this side either. To conclude we
can see that the likelihood of an investment being syndicated is driven by industry
characteristics, such that more mature and established industries exhibit a lower
level of syndication. However, the syndication variable simply shows us one side
of the medal and further conclusions about the extent of co-investing behavior
are necessary.
18Table 5:
Funded Firm Characteristics and the Likelihood of Investment Syndication
Dependent Variable: Indicator = 1 If Investment is syndicated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Biotech 1.044391 0.4626848 0.8915364 0.3617342
(0.014)¤¤ (0.371) (0.367) (0.570)
Consulting -0.0278637 -0.8502698 -0.9330893 -1.17719
(0.950) (0.121) (0.351) (0.078)¤
Electronics 0.1808681 -0.4196427 -0.4748383 -0.845529
(0.675) (0.420) (0.626) (0.173)
Utilities 0.3342021 -0.6923599 -1.15252 -1.511223
(0.652) (0.410) (0.421) (0.209)
Financial -0.6817185 -2.278076
(0.254) (0.048)¤¤
Ind. Products -0.71562 -1.271433 -1.131323 -1.525869
(0.107) (0.018)¤¤ (0.262) (0.023)¤¤
Ind. Services -0.4924765 -1.644529 -1.499357 -2.242104
(0.365) (0.022)¤¤ (0.208) (0.053)¤
Internet 0.4928071 -0.1373318 0.6261075 0.5856402
(0.244) (0.793) (0.518) (0.369)
Pharma 0.3118963 -0.1562939 -0.8387271
(0.523) (0.795) (0.493)
Media -0.1670541 -0.7560713 -1.328578 -1.059294
(0.713) (0.178) (0.232) (0.162)
Medical 0.0953102 2.137718 2.227342
(0.845) (0.404) (0.136)
Software 0.3184537 -0.3281648 0.2938748 -0.2749844









Age at Inv. -0.0240554 -0.0244372 -0.0144664
(0.013)¤¤ (0.248) (0.370)
Number of obs 1485 925 394 278
Â2 ¡ Test 0.0392 0.0659 57.21 0.1082
Pseudo R2 0.0392 0.0659 0.1111 0.1082
The table reports a logit model estimating the likelihood of an investment deal being syndicated. The
sample for the ¯rst regression includes 1485 venture capital deals that have either been syndicated (1)
or not syndicated (0). For the second regression the sample has been reduced to 925 deals for which we
can calculate the Age of the investment target at the date of investment. Column 3 and 4 use a reduced
sample of deals for which we have further information on the average size of the target over the period
1999 to 2004 and the size at the investment date, respectively. The table reports the coe±cient estimate
along with the p-values in parentheses.Intercepts are not shown. The variable Consumer Products has
been dropped.
*, **, *** denotes signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
193.2 Firm Characteristics and the Number of Investors
In order to draw inferences about the level of co-investment activity we ana-
lyze the number of co-investors per portfolio company if it actually comes to a
syndication. The hypothesis under investigation is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: A higher ¯rm risk increases the Number of Investors per company
Besides a di®erent dependent variable we will leave the explanatory variables
the same as in the ¯rst regression. However, as the number of investors is not
bounded to be a zero/one variable but ¯nite we run a ordered probit regres-
sion. The results are reported in table 6. From the results reported in Table 6
we can infer that among the Industry Dummys only the coe±cient associated
with the dummy variable Biotech is positive and signi¯cant. This indicates that
the level of co-investment activity is higher in these industries. The more ma-
ture Industrial Products and Industrial Services Industries along with Media and
Communication (for the last two regression speci¯cations) show a much lower
number of investors per funded ¯rm.As pointed our earlier, we ¯nd evidence that
industry characeristics (such as in Bygrave (1987)) are important when deciding
on syndication behavior. Additionally, we can con¯rm that the number of em-
ployees has a positive and signi¯cant e®ect (for the employees at investment date
as well as for the average number of employees), whereas the sales variable does
have an impact on the syndication behavior. As a matter of fact we ¯nd that
size as measured by the number of employees, which somehow also represents the
future growth potential in terms of knowledge and skills, increases the number
of investors per funded ¯rm. We can infer that VC ¯rms do not make use of
syndication in order to reduce size exposure (as measured by the sales variable)
but rather co-invest in companies with larger (and somewhat more uncertain)
growth potentials (as measured by a larger number of employees).
All other variables do not exhibit a signi¯cant e®ect on the level of co-investment
activity. Thus, we can see that for Biotech Investments there is a much higher
level of co-investors involved during the di®erent ¯nancing rounds and the num-
ber of investors per company is signi¯cantly higher when compared to other
industries. Apparently, there seems to be a need for involving other partners in
order to be better able to cope with industry particularities. We get the im-
pression that Biotech with its ever changing technologies pose more challenges to
the investors than do the more established industries, as for example industrial
products or services. So clearly there appears to be a much stronger need to
rely on outside help and expertise to secure future success and pro¯tability for
the venture under consideration. Thus, a complementary skill set helps VC¶s to
overcome the arising complications in deal making due to industry speci¯cations
and particularities.
20Table 6:
Funded Firm Characteristics and the Number of Investors per Company
Dependent Variable: Number of Investors per Company
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Biotech 0.9569729 0.6517574 0.95192 0.4160098
(0.000)¤¤¤ (0.030)¤¤ (0.101) (0.321)
Consulting -0.00471 -0.4019452 -0.4229229 -0.6570024
(0.986) (0.208) (0.469) (0.131)
Electronics 0.2433624 -0.112672 -0.1131586 -0.6202675
(0.340) (0.711) (0.843) (0.133)
Utilities 0.4812692 -0.0940139 -0.2661663 -0.6139745
(0.257) (0.843) (0.733) (0.349)
Financial -0.4234859 -1.162402
(0.228) (0.051)¤
Ind. Products -0.3733178 -0.678216 -0.8641099 -1.576081
(0.152) (0.029)¤¤ (0.149) (0.002)¤¤¤
Ind. Services -0.0809653 -0.7486239 -0.6286773 -1.13664
(0.794) (0.057)¤ (0.343) (0.053)¤
Internet 0.4247574 0.0100222 0.3179499 0.0053781
(0.089) (0.974) (0.576) (0.990)
Pharma 0.3598728 0.1642243 -.1386862
(0.211) (0.638) (0.842)
Media -0.0313365 -0.3866111 -1.210668 -1.400573
(0.907) (0.240) (0.089)¤ (0.028)¤¤
Medical 0.2516524 -0.0628654 0.9721944
(0.378) (0.850) (0.160)
Software 0.3217388 -0.0209573 0.2109437 -0.3609383





LN(Emp. at Inv.) 0.2416084
(0.021)¤¤
LN(Sales at Inv.) -0.0780369
(0.336)
Age at Inv. -0.0156145 -0.0203374 -0.0036353
(0.004)¤¤¤ (0.108) (0.790)
Number of obs. 1485 925 394 242
Â2 ¡ Test 127.27 119.65 86.37 5.63
Pseude R2 0.039 0.056 0.091 0.1873
The table reports an ordered probit regression model estimating the number of investors per investment
target. The sample for the ¯rst regression includes 1485 venture capital deals. For the second regres-
sion the sample has been reduced to 925 deals for which we can calculate the Age of the investment
target at the date of investment. Column 3 and 4 use a reduced sample of deals for which we have
further information on the average size of the target over the period 1999 to 2004 and the size at the
investment date, respectively. The table reports the coe±cient estimate along with the p-values in
parentheses.Intercepts are not shown. The variable Consumer Products has been dropped.
*, **, *** denotes signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
213.3 Venture Capitalist Characteristics and The Propen-
sity to Syndicate
As one could see from the results there seems to be an in°uence of industry fac-
tors on the overall propensity to syndicate as well as on the number of investors
that participate in such a deal. As a matter of fact we are therefore interested
in turning the wheel around to see which factors from the venture capitalist side
do actually a®ect the likelihood of an investment being syndicated. Several other
studies have explained that experience and sharing of resources plays a distinctive
role in explaining the reasons behind the syndication patterns. Maula and Mur-
ray (2000) identify the need for complementary resources, including intangible
assets like industry experience or tangible assets like warehousing. They o®er no
explicit ¯ndings regarding to what extent the ¯nancial perspective is involved as
a motive for syndication. Brander et al. (2002) concentrate on the resource-based
rationale. In their conclusion, they clearly favour the Value Added Hypothesis.
This is underlined by the ¯nding that syndicated investments have higher rates
of return than stand-alone investments. They acknowledge the value of a second
opinion in the investment selection process, but state that their empirical analy-
sis identi¯es the value added e®ect as the driving force behind VC syndication.
They conclude that risk-sharing might play a role, but emphasize at the same
time that they see capital constraints only as an issue in some special cases and
rather not for large VC ¯rms which do most of VC investing.
First of all we want to have a look at how VC characteristics in°uence the propen-
sity to syndicate an investment. The results on the investee companies suggested
that there is an in°uence of industry particularities on the likelihood of an in-
vestment being syndicated. However, this of course gives us simply one side of
the entire story and experience and expertise might also impact the likelihood
of syndication as a VC might overcome industry riskiness when he is acquainted
with the skills needed to survive and be successful in that market. As a conse-
quence, being in the possession of experience and skills would also make him less
prone to co-invest a deal. As a consequence we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Inexperience creates a need for additional expertise to ensure suc-
cess in the management of the investments and therefore fosters the propensity
to syndicate an investment
Here it is analysed how the a±liation and experience of VC investors in°uences
their propensity to syndicate. Thus, we would expect to see di®erences in the syn-
dication behavior of Foreign VC companies, independent VC¶s, Bank dependent
VC¶s and so on. Table 3 in Chapter 2 summarizes the di®erent categories of VC
investors we consider for the following analysis. We want to test whether there
is a signi¯cant in°uence of the VC background or a±liation on its propensity to
22syndicate an investment. Thus, we test the relationship between VC background
as the independent variable and the syndication ratio as the dependent variable.
From the de¯nition of the Syndication Ratio in Chapter 2 we can infer that it is
bounded above and below by 1 and 0 respectively. As a consequence we need to
run a multivariate Tobit model that is truncated at an upper and lower bound





ui : if yi ¸ ui
yi : if li · yi · ui
li : if yi · li
where li and ui represent the lower and upper censoring points for the regression.
As a consequence the range for the syndication ratio will be between 1 and 0.
y(Syndication Ratio) = f(No: V C Investments ;V C Dummies) + ²i (2)
Table 7 indicates that the coe±cient for the number of investments undertaken
by a VC is negative and signi¯cant throughout 3 out of 4 model speci¯cations.
This indicates that experience, gathered through deal making and structuring
leads to valuable insights and therefore reduces the need to depend on partners
for complementary skills and knowledge. From table 7 we can also infer that
the coe±cient associated with the Dummy for Foreign Investors is positive and
signi¯cant for the tobit speci¯cations 3 and 4. Here we can see, that once we
restrict our analysis to more time investors those with a foreign origin tend to
syndicate more than their local counterparts. This seems to lend support to the
hypothesis that experience and expertise, along with a certain market familiarity
is necessary to successful manage venture investments. Syndicating as part of
an entry strategy can therefore help to overcome the lack of experience within a
foreign market by combining the ¯nancial resources of the foreign investor with
the skills and expertise with a local VC. The table also reveals that the investment
focus of a VC has an in°uence on the propensity to syndicate. VCs focusing
on Non-High ventures syndicate to a much lesser extent (at the 5% and 10%
level for the two regressions, respectively), while VCs that focus on Medical and
Information technology ¯rms syndicate to a larger extent. This e®ect disappears
once we control for the experience of the VC ¯rms by restricting the analysis to
¯rms that have undertaken multiple investments. Moreover, we ¯nd that ¯rms
that invest a larger percentage of their portfolio in the German market make less
use of ¯nancing. The coe±cient is negative and signi¯cant at the 10% for all
investors and at the 5% level for investors with multiple deals. Thus, ¯rms that
clearly concentrate their investments into one market, rely less on syndication.
As such, we can see that experience and knowledge about local particularities
in°uence the decision to syndicate an investment.
23Table 7:
VC Characteristics and the e®ect on the Syndication Ratio
Dependent Variable: Syndication Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investments -.0107965 -0.0076817 -0.0018292 -0.0044799
(0.030)¤¤ (0.020)¤¤ (0.454) (0.048)¤¤
Foreign VC 0.8002847 1.001335 0.9046751 0.6440691
(0.206) (0.031)¤¤ (0.022)¤¤ (0.029)¤¤
Banking VC 0.5420354 0.7623876 0.4218244 0.4153956
(0.409) (0.100)¤ (0.292) (0.153)
Corporate VC 0.5419057 0.742247 0.653342 0.5637431
(0.401) (0.116) (0.106) (0.062)
Independent .0480121 0.4198155 0.3081937 0.3006097
(0.939) (0.341) (0.428) (0.274)
Public VC 0.3231654 0.6116089 0.401304 0.3993877















Number of obs. 588 275 251 151
Â2 ¡ Test 38.56 73.68 42.91 48.29
Pseudo R2 0.0332 0.1464 0.0903 0.2174
The table reports a tobit model estimating the impact of VC characteristics and a±liation on the
syndication ratio. The sample for the ¯rst regression includes 588 venture capital ¯rms. For the second
regression the sample has been reduced to 275 for which information about the ¯rm¶s characteristics
and investment policy have been obtained. Column 3 and 4 use a reduced sample of deals in which we
have only included venture capital ¯rms that have at least invested twice over the period 1996-2004. The
table reports the coe±cient estimate along with the p-values in parentheses.Intercepts are not shown.
The variable Co-Operative VC has been dropped.
*, **, *** denotes signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
24To further conclude on the e®ect of experience gathered through investment ac-
tivities we have grouped the VC ¯rms into size categories re°ecting the number
of deals undertaken by the ¯rms. The model speci¯cation is analogues to the to-
bit regression using the a±liation dummies. As a consequence we used the same
hypothesis as above and used size dummies instead of background dummies for
the independent variables. In order to test the relation between experience and
the propensity to syndicate a censored Tobit model is run again with the Syndi-
cation Ratio as dependent variable and the classi¯ed number of investments as
independent variable.
Table 8 shows the results from the regression output. Here we can see that the
coe±cient associated with the dummy variable one time investors is positive and
signi¯cant at the 1% level indicating that this investor group syndicates signi¯-
cantly more. Moreover, the dummy variable for small investment ¯rms (with 2 to
4 deals) is also signi¯cant across the di®erent model speci¯cations. This therefore
lends support to the hypothesis of lower experience levels being a main driver of
deal syndication. Smaller VC ¯rms tend to syndicate signi¯cantly more than
larger VC investors. Moreover, we ¯nd the e®ect of the percentage of the over-
all investment portfolio more pronounced than in the last model speci¯cations.
Firms that invest more of their funds into the local market tend to syndicate
less. Thus, experience and familiarity with local particularities do indeed in°u-
ence the propensity to syndicate negatively. VC ¯rms that have acquired skills
during their previous investments and ¯rms that are familiar to the market need
to make less use of syndication to overcome a rather scarce knowledge base. In
addition we ¯nd that the focus on Medical or Information Technology of a VC
¯rm in°uences the propensity to syndicate positively,while the focus on rather
mature Non-High Tech industries has a negative e®ect and leads ¯rms to invest
alone.
Overall we can see that experience and resources seem to play a role in explaining
the syndication behavior of players in the German VC market, whereas we do not
¯nd evidence on risk spreading or portfolio diversi¯cation based on the outcome of
the past analysis here. However, in the next subsection we tested further to which
extent ¯nancial arguments as opposed to resource driven might have explanatory
power in determining the e®ect on the observable syndication behavior.
25Table 8:
VC Characteristics and the e®ect on the Syndication Ratio
Dependent Variable: Syndication Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
One Time 0.9220807 0.7414938
(0.000)¤¤¤ (0.000)¤¤¤
Small (2-4) 0.5030997 0.4722779 0.0578574 0.2078103
(0.037)¤¤ (0.001)¤¤¤ (0.562) (0.020)¤¤
Medium (5-10) 0.0140301 0.0216411 -0.2720483 -0.1073
(0.956) (0.877) (0.013)¤¤ (0.234)
V. Large (> 30) -0.0477578 -0.0282765 -0.2816935 -0.1479572













Number of obs. 588 275 251 151
Â2 ¡ Test 43.83 87.21 13.95 46.75
Pseudo R2 0.0378 0.1732 0.0302 0.2087
The table reports a tobit model estimating the impact of VC size categories and characteristics on
the syndication ratio. The sample for the ¯rst regression includes 588 venture capital ¯rms. For the
second regression the sample has been reduced to 275 ¯rms for which information about the ¯rm¶s
characteristics and investment policy have been obtained. Column 3 and 4 use a reduced sample of
deals in which we have only included venture capital ¯rms that have at least invested twice over the
period 1996-2004. The table reports the coe±cient estimate along with the p-values in parentheses.
Intercepts are not shown. The variable Large VC has been dropped.
*, **, *** denotes signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
263.4 VC Investments and Portfolio Concentration
The results obtained in the last chapters favor the resource motives, whereas we
still need to disentangle the e®ects of resource driven motives and a risk mitigation
perspective in order to make more pronounced inferences when explaining the
syndication behavior. In order to draw a meaningful distinction between the
two motives or to conclude that the two might be complements rather than
substitutes in explaining syndication patterns, we investigated the e®ect of VC
characteristics on the overall portfolio concentration. Once VC ¯rms specialize
in certain industries we should see a much higher level of portfolio concentration.
Theory predicts that according to the resource based rationale of Venture Capital
Syndication ¯rms syndicate in order to get access to deals in new industries by
complementing their existing resources, that are limited to the skills needed in
their existing portfolio industries, with a new set of capabilities from the partner
¯rm that enables the company to make investment in new industries worthwhile.
The bene¯t of involving co-investors is derived from heterogeneous skills and
information di®erent venture capitalists can contribute to the management of
the venture company.
There could therefore be a tradeo® between the two competing views on Venture
Capital Syndication. Investors could try to make use of syndication in order to
diversify their existing portfolios and to reduce overall exposure to certain in-
dustries. However, investors could on the same token be less inclined to acquire
additional information on ¯rms and industry wide outlooks for non-core indus-
tries, as the additional costs of acquiring information might be higher than the
bene¯ts from additional diversi¯cation e®ects. Consequently, we looked at the
portfolio concentration of the VC companies in the sample and ¯gured what the
e®ect of syndication patterns is for the overall constitution of the portfolio of
investments. We formulate two hypothesis dealing with the competing tradeo®
laid out above.
Hypothesis 5a: Syndication serves as a mean to reduce exposure to certain indus-
tries for reasons of diversi¯cation and decreases the level of portfolio concentra-
tion.
Hypothesis 5a would therefore speak in favor of the ¯nancial diversi¯cation motive
for why VC ¯rms syndicate. Here we would expect that syndication serves as
a tool to decrease exposure to certain industries and to yield a better risk and
return tradeo®. Alternatively, we could also formulate Hypothesis 5b.
Hypothesis 5b: Syndication serves as a mean to increase exposure to certain indus-
tries by bringing in a set of heterogenous skills and increases the level of portfolio
concentration.
For hypothesis 5b we would expect VC ¯rms to make use of syndication practice
in order to get access to new industries or increase the exposure to existing
27industries by adding more value to the companies under management with the
complementing set of skills and resources brought in by the partner VC.
In the following we ran a 2 Stage Least Sqares regression in order to estimate the
impact of the VC a±liation variables (independent, bank dependent etc.) along
with the total number of investments, the syndication ratio and the total number
of co-investors along with variables describing the investment activities of the
VC (Capital under Management, Sum and Percentages invested in Germany and
Focus) on the overall level of portfolio concentration as the dependent variable.






Where Si denotes the relative share of a certain industry in the overall portfolio.
Therefore the closer H is to one, the more the deals are concentrated within
a few industry segments. So apparently, the score will only be meaningful for
venture capitalist having at least two deals, as otherwise the scores will be biased
upwards. It serves as a proxy to which extent the VCs invest more heavily in
speci¯c industries or to which extent they diversify.
The syndication ratio is used as de¯ned previously. The variable "Co-Investors"
represents the total number of di®erent co-investors with whom the VC has un-
dertaken a deal. So, if for example a VC has been doing transactions with a single
partner frequently, we will simply count this variable as 1 di®erent partner. As
such, the variable can account for the degree of diversity in partner selection.
The other variables are as de¯ned previously.
For the First Stage estimation we use the variable "Number of Total Investments"
as the instrument to proxy the "Co-Investor" variable.
The Second Stage equation is as follows:
y(H) = f(CoInv: ;Dummies;SyndRatio; Cap; GSum; GPerc; Focus) + ²i
(4)
From the results (reported in table 9) we can see that the coe±cient associated
with the "Syndication Ratio" variable is positive and signi¯cant (at the 1% level),
whereas the coe±cient associated with the instrumented variable "Co-Investors"
is negative and signi¯cant (at the 5% level).. All other variables are not sta-
tistically signi¯cant. Therefore we can interpret the results in the way that an
increase in the number of di®erent co-investors decreases the portfolio concentra-
tion. On the opposite an increase in the syndication ratio increases the overall
portfolio concentration. The background of the VC does not have any in°uence
on the level of portfolio concentration.
28Table 9:
The E®ect of Syndication on Portfolio Concentration
Dependent Variable: VC Portfolio Concentration





Syndication 26.6516 0.1907951 34.75287 0.2383061
(0.000)¤¤¤ (0.005)¤¤¤ (0.000)¤¤¤ (0.004)¤¤¤
Foreign 3.188471 0.04533129 10.45881 0.0522024
(0.769) (0.817) (0.062)¤ (0.799)
Banking 9.549708 -0.0478916 17.59929 -0.0744838
(0.384) (0.808) (0.005)¤¤¤ (0.720)
Corporate -4.49988 0.1961287 -10.92237 0.1749238
(0.683) (0.332) (0.403) (0.428)
Independent 2.528664 -0.0202043 10.919 -0.0506117
(0.811) (0.917) (0.044) (0.800)
Public -.1377413 0.0531055 4.284693 -0.0638226
(0.990) (0.790) (0.524) (0.777)
Cap 0.0004542 -0.0000107
(0.567) (0.212)¤
German Sum -0.0126139 -0.0000525
(0.396) (0.717)
German Perc. -0.0824838 -0.0021537
(0.629) (0.000)¤¤¤
Number of obs 222 222 151 151
F-Test 113.5 7.33 58.33 15.88
R2 0.7871 0.1911 0.7926 0.2539
The table reports a 2 SLS regression estimating the impact of VC characteristics on portfolio concen-
tration. The table reports the First Stage regression in columns 1 and 3. The variable "Co-Investors"
has been instrumented by "Number of Investors" in both regressions. Regression 2 in columns 3 and
4 di®ers in respect to the model in columns 1 and 2 as we have included additional VC characteristics
into the regression to explain the e®ect on portfolio concentration. The table reports the coe±cient
estimate along with the p-values in parentheses. Intercepts are not shown. The variable Co-Operative
has been dropped.
*, **, *** denotes signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
29The results indicate that VC ¯rms will increase their portfolio concentration
via the route of syndication. Thus, syndication serves primarily as a tool to
increase the ability to manage the companies within the core industry. As such,
a company even strengthens their focus on certain industries via syndication with
already existing partners and builds upon the existing resources with an increased
collaboration within the established partnerships.
At the contrary, an increase in the number of co-investors decreases the portfolio
concentration. So if VC ¯rms feel the need to diversify their portfolio they opt
for this route via an increased use of partnerships with new co-investors and
therefore broaden the scope of investments by involving new partners. Thus, the
step into a new industry is also driven by cooperating with a new partner. The
diversity of partners in the network can therefore proxy for a more diversi¯ed
portfolio of investments. Interestingly, none of the VC background dummies is
signi¯cant indicating that diversi¯cation via an increased variety of co-investors
seems to be the preferable way among all investor classes.
3.5 The Development of VC Investments and Portfolio
Concentration
In a second step we arranged the available transactions over the time period
1996 - 2004 and analyzed the portfolios and more importantly the changes in the
portfolios for the largest 22 Venture Capital providers in our sample. We thus
investigate how the overall portfolio concentration changes over time with respect
to new transactions and new partner involvement.
As such we want to estimate the impact that syndication and new partner in-
volvement have on the level of portfolio concentration over time. Moreover, we
included variables describing the entire market development. In particular we
want to see whether the e®ects pointed out in the last subsection are consistent
over time and how market factors in°uence the extent of portfolio decisions.
In the upcoming analysis we test the same hypothesis as in section 3.4. Ad-
ditionally we have included some new variables to the regressions. Namely, we
have included a variable describing the overall ability of VC ¯rms to exit their
investments. This "Exitability" variable proxies for the possibility of a VC to
exit his investments and thereby reducing the investment exposure. A higher
level of "Exitability" gives more room to withdraw money from deals and to
avoid be caught in a course of action. "Exitability" is measured as the percent-
age of positive exits (either trade sales or IPOs) to the overall number of exits
(including liquidations) within the German market. All market statistics have
been calculated using the Yearbook of the German Venture Capital Association
30(BVK (2004)). Moreover, we have included a variable describing the market con-
ditions for IPO¶s in the market. The "IPO" variable depicts on the one hand
the visibility of investment exits which in turn could in°uence the new capital
in°ow and on the other hand gives an indication about the possibility of having a
"golden bullet" exit. Thus, a higher number of IPOs compared to other sources
of exits yields better chances of a successful exit. To control for capital in°ows
by the market we have included a variable controlling for fundraising activities.
The "Fundraising" variable thus depicts the total capital in°ow to the industry
and proxies the market conditions for Venture Capital as an investment vehicle.
In the regressions we have chosen the level of portfolio concentration as our de-
pendent variable (as in chapter 3.4) and included the syndication ratio for each
year along with the number of co-investors for each period. As opposed to the
last sections we calculated the number of new co-investors for each period. So if,
for example, a VC worked with a partner in 1996 and had deals in 1997 and 1998
this partner is only counted for in the ¯rst year of collaboration. As such the
variable "Co-Investors" measures the number of new partners that get involved
with each of the 22 VCs in a given period. The variable "Syndication Ratio" is
as de¯ned before. In order to control for endogeneity in our variables we use a
3SLS regression. The number of investments can well be in°uenced by the overall
level of fundraising activities and also by the ability of a VC to take ¯rms public,
which increases the visibility of Venture Capital as an investment vehicle and
could in turn drive up investments given the higher chances of a "golden bullet"
exit. As before, we let the number of new co-investors be instrumented by the
number of investments a VC has been made. Table 10 reports the results of the
3SLS estimation.
31Table 10:
The E®ect of Syndication on Portfolio Concentration over Time
Dependent Variable: VC Portfolio Concentration




Syndication .5353317 7.236368 1.363921
(0.000)¤¤¤ (0.000)¤¤¤ (0.210)




L-Ipo -2.499913 48.3392 57.47167
(0.000)¤¤¤ (0.001)¤¤¤ (0.000)¤¤¤
L-Fundraising -.0000193 .0004139 0.0005111
(0.026)¤¤ (0.043)¤¤ (0.000)¤¤¤
Number of obs 176 176 176
Â2-Test 26.42 74.86 46.08
R2 0.0132 0.5570 0.2126
The table reports a 3 SLS regression estimating the impact of VC characteristics on portfolio concentra-
tion. The variable "Co-Investors" has been instrumented by "Number of Investments". Additionally,
the variable "Number of Investments" has been instrumented by the variables "Fundraising" and "IPO".
Both enter the regressions as lagged variables. The table reports the coe±cient estimate along with the
p-values in parentheses. Intercepts are not shown.
*, **, *** denotes signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
The results indicate the same e®ect that has already been pointed to in chapter
3.4. The coe±cient associated with the variable "Co-Investors" is negative and
signi¯cant (at the 1% level) and the coe±cient associated with the variable "Syn-
dication Ratio" is positive and signi¯cant. The results indicate that syndication
serves as a mean to increase portfolio concentration and is a tool to increase the
ability to manage the companies within the core industry. As mentioned before,
a syndicating VC company even strengthens its industry focus via syndication
with already existing partners and can build upon the existing resources with an
increased collaboration.
At the contrary, an increase in the number of co-investors decreases the portfolio
concentration. So if VC ¯rms feel the need to diversify their portfolio they will
do so via an increased use of partnerships with new co-investors. Which on the
same token broadens the scope of investments as the step into a new industry is
32also driven by cooperating with a new partner. The diversity of partners in the
network can therefore proxy for a more diversi¯ed portfolio of investments.
Consequently, we need to distinguish two di®erent perspectives on VC syndication
behavior here. Firstly, syndication per se can not be associated with a pure
diversi¯cation strategy. Diversi¯cation only comes into play when the VC ¯rm
also chooses to build up a new partnership with the syndication step on the
same token. Moreover, in order to be able to actually achieve such diversi¯cation
bene¯ts from syndication the VC has to involve a number of new partners into his
existing network in order to be able to gain a signi¯cant e®ect on the portfolio. Or
putting it di®erently, he might be simply joining an already successful syndicate
to take the route to a new industry for which he does not possess the skills to
survive. Thus, the option to diversify is driven by syndication with a number
of new partners in an industry outside of the predominant industry focus of the
investment portfolio in place. To sum it up, syndication is used as a tool to
strengthen focus on core industries, whereas syndication with a larger number of
new co-investors or the decision to join a new syndicate can achieve substantial
diversi¯cation bene¯ts for the portfolio and open up potential for new business.
In fact, there is an evolution within the industry in terms of formation and
closure of syndicates by which the partners extent their investment scope and
on the same token opt for either an increased bene¯t from diversi¯cation or a
higher level of concentration on core industries. Financial and resource driven
motives can thus be present at the same time and are not mutually exclusive
but rather complement each other. In order to understand the driving forces of
syndication behavior we have therefore shown that both factors alike contribute
to the observable patterns, each in its own distinct way.
3.6 Quantifying the Value-Added e®ect of Syndication
In chapter 3.4 and 3.5 we have shown that syndication serves as a mean to increase
portfolio exposure and as such one would assume that the concentration on certain
industries helps the VC ¯rms to lever upon their combined experience and know-
how. Thus, the combined e®ort of the syndication partners should add value to
the venture. It has been pointed out earlier that we can distinguish between two
di®erent dimensions in which a involved partner can add value to the venture
under consideration. At the pre-investment stage, Lerner (1994) suggests the
Selection Hypothesis as a rational for VC syndication. Under this hypothesis the
evaluation process before the selection of an investment opportunity is undertaken
by more than one venture capitalist. The evaluation of the same venture proposal
by di®erent VC companies operating in a syndicate reduces therefore the potential
danger of adverse selection. The combined e®ort to assess the quality of a venture
helps VC investors to overcome informational asymmetries as the entrepreneurs
33typically know more about the investment opportunity they seek funding for and
might overstate the attractiveness of his business proposal (Sorenson and Stuart
(1999)).
However, it has to be stated that the Superior Selection Hypothesis does not
hold in the case of a lead investor undertaking the whole deal at ¯rst and then
syndicating down the investment to other investors. As such, it will be hard to
argue with any di®erences in the performance of the venture accruing to superior
selection when a second or third venture capital provider has entered at a later
stage. In this sense we could, however, argue with a value added stemming
from the involvement of other VC partners. The Value Added Hypothesis in
terms of managerial activities is a resource-based motive for syndication which
holds for the post- investment stage. Under the Value Added Hypothesis venture
capitalists are considered to add value to the performance of the venture after
they invested in it (Brander et al. (2002)).
It has been pointed out that a lead investor acts according to the Value Added
Hypothesis when he believes that the involvement of other venture capitalists
would add some value to the venture. The bene¯t of involving co-investors is
derived from heterogeneous skills and information di®erent venture capitalists
can contribute to the management of the venture company. The need for such
additional resources is anticipated to be greater in earlier stages of an investment,
than in later-stage investments. This is mainly due to the fact that more mature
investee-companies already have an established management structure and mar-
ket position and have already built relationships with suppliers and customers
(Lockett and Wright (1999), Brander et al. (2002)).
In the following we therefore investigate whether the fact that an investment has
been syndicated does in°uence the performance of the venture. Moreover, we
test whether the number of investors involved in a syndicate has an impact on
the prospective performance. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: Syndication helps to lever upon a set of heterogenous skills and
increases the performance of the portfolio company
Consequently, we estimate a regression having the sales growth and the employee
growth of a VC ¯nanced ¯rm as the dependent variable. The variable "Sales
Growth", respectively "Employee Growth", is calculated as the average growth
rate after the investee has been funded by a single VC or the ¯rst VC of a syndi-
cate. The explanatory variables are the industries in which the investee companies
are active in, in order to control for industry speci¯c growth e®ects along with
the age of the ¯rm, as more mature companies with an already established man-
agement and social ties, might not bene¯t as much as younger companies from
the experience of the VC ¯rms involved (Brander et al. (2002)). Table 11 shows
the results.
34Table 11:
The E®ect of Syndication on Firm Performance
Dependent Variable
Sales Growth Employee Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Syndicated (1/0) 3.399509 -0.0680984
(0.026)¤¤ (0.910)
No. Investors 0.7036584 0.1066621
(0.120) (0.559)
Biotech -2.737629 -2.780774 -3.728515 -4.008911
(0.713) (0.713) (0.197) (0.169)
Consulting -1.103569 -0.4377234 -4.01488 -4.028116
(0.881) (0.953) (0.167) (0.165)
Electronics -0.0542175 0.3846458 -4.278532 -4.261153
(0.994) (0.958) (0.140) (0.141)
Utilities -1.628885 -1.76073 0.4717115 0.5297976
(0.855) (0.844) (0.893) (0.880)
Ind. Products -2.205319 -1.696061 -4.247958 -4.244977
(0.762) (0.817) (0.148) (0.148)
Ind. Services -1.236531 -1.242741 -4.146538 -4.172626
(0.881) (0.881) (0.222) (0.219)
Internet 3.05159 4.17365 -2.057717 -2.135937
(0.679) (0.571) (0.473) (0.456)
Pharma -0.907655 -0.4932567 -1.922684 -1.975652
(0.919) (0.956) (0.570) (0.560)
Media 3.991512 4.383208 -3.541049 -3.546498
(0.600) (0.566) (0.231) (0.230)
Medical -1.498873 -0.5388895 -3.560982 -3.74967
(0.857) (0.949) (0.283) (0.258)
Software -1.458231 -0.5361339 -2.940378 -3.010644
(0.841) (0.941) (0.298) (0.286)
Age at Inv. -0.0278315 -0.0331789 -0.0068155 -0.0066063
(0.528) (0.453) (0.765) (0.772)
Number of obs 314 314 296 296
F-Test 1.25 1.04 1.02 1.05
R2 0.01 0.002 0.001 0.002
The table reports an OLS regression estimating the impact of ¯rm characteristics on ¯rm growth.
Columns (1) and (2) include all funded ¯rms for which data on sales growth after the ¯rst funding event
was available. Columns (3) and (4) include all funded ¯rms for which data on employee growth was
available. The table reports the coe±cient estimate along with the p-values in parentheses. Intercepts
are not shown. The variable "Financial" has been dropped.
*, **, *** denotes signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
35We can see that the coe±cient associated with the zero/one variable "Syndi-
cation" is positive and signi¯cant for the ¯rst regression but not for the third
regression. We can therefore see that syndication has a positive impact on sales
growth for the funded ¯rms. Employee growth, however, remains una®ected by
the syndication e®orts. Moreover, we can infer that the coe±cient associated with
the number of investors per funded ¯rm is insigni¯cant in both, the sales growth
and the employee growth, regression. While syndication has a positive e®ect on
growth, the number of investors does not have an impact on the prospects of the
company. Interestingly, syndication helps ¯rms to grow in terms of sales but does
not impact the number of employees in the same fashion. In this respect, our
results speak for a value added through networking activities brought together
by the investment partners.
Our results in this respect are in line with the results by Audretsch and Lehmann(2004)
who found that in a sample of VC ¯nanced ¯rms that went public at the "Neuer
Markt" in Germany syndicated investment outperformed non-syndicated invest-
ments in terms of revenue growth. Moreover, Brander et al. (2002) also see the
Value Added Hypothesis leading to higher returns of co- invested deals. In order
to test if syndicated VC investments have higher or lower returns they used the
Macdonald & Associates database for returns on Canadian VC investments and
¯nd that syndicated investment projects have signi¯cantly higher returns than
investments of a stand-alone status. Additionally, we con¯rmed the theoretical
arguments of Fluck et al. (2005) that syndication of Venture Capital Investments
bene¯ts the venture capital provider due to the increased value of the venture
(measured here in terms of sales growth) stemming from the increased e®ort of
the entrepreneur.
364 Conclusion
In this paper we made the e®ort to shed light on the syndication behavior of Ven-
ture Capitalists in Germany. Using a sample of 2.500 VC investments undertaken
in Germany we hypothesized investment behavior and tested the potential conse-
quences against the actual empirical outcome of the data set. Here we could see
that analyzing the actual behavior helps us to better understand the rationales
of VC syndication.
The results found in our analysis support the conclusions put forward by Chiplin
et al. (1997) that with a higher level of experience VC ¯rms are less inclined
to syndicate a deal with a partner. Therefore more experienced VC ¯rms do
not have to rely on external expertise and the additional bene¯ts of syndicating
in order to acquire new information might not be as high as to overcome the
additional costs associated with monitoring and coordinating the deal together.
Moreover, we showed that the actual outcome data gives rise to the resource-
based rationale for VC syndication as informational asymmetry could be over-
come when partners are involved into the decision making process in the pre-
and post-investment stage. We ¯nd evidence that a lower level of experience and
expertise fosters the need to syndicate an investment, which indicates the validity
of the resource and value added concept. Also in line with Chiplin et al. (1997)
we see less experienced venture capital ¯rms as more likely to syndicate deals.
The results indicate that, holding all other factors constant, a higher degree of
experience of a VC ¯rm lowers its likelihood to syndicate investments. Addition-
ally, we have pointed out the evidence that syndication indeed can be contributed
to a value added e®ect. We document that ¯rms that can bene¯t from the com-
plementary skill set of syndicate partners are associated with a higher level of
sales growth after the funding events.
In addition we brought forward the need to consider ¯nancial and resource driven
motives simultaneously as both might at the same time have an impact on the
observed syndication pattern. Consequently we found that allthough syndication
seems to be driven by industry characteristics and venture capital experience
there is also evidence that indicates the need for diversi¯cation in a portfolio
context. Here we also pointed out the complementarity of the two motives for
Venture Capital Syndication that could at the same time a®ect a VCs decision to
syndicate an investment. Additionally, we found that syndication per se does not
act as a tool for portfolio diversi¯cation but at the contrary serves to strengthen
the VC objective and focus on certain industries and thus increases the overall
concentration in the portfolio. However, we also noted that the involvement of
new (in the sense of being di®erent from the existing ones) co-investors can de-
crease the level of portfolio concentration and thus VCs tend to broaden their
investment scope by partnering with a larger number of new VCs in a new or
37under-represented industry. However, one needs to better investigate the trade
o® between the additional costs of information acquisition as opposed to the ad-
ditional bene¯ts of portfolio diversi¯cation. Only then we are able to gain better
insights into the formation and closure of networks within the VC industry and
are therefore able to gauge new perspectives on how and why ¯rms syndicate.
However, in order to be able to draw further conclusions one would need longi-
tudinal data to see how ties between the parties are built and how ¯rms enter
new markets an industries via the route of syndication. Additionally, this could
also yield insights into the role of trust and reciprocity when extending existing
networks. With our analysis we laid the ground to regard ¯nance and resource
motives as complementary alternatives that need to be investigated further hav-
ing in mind the potential evolution of partnerships across time and space.
Moreover, the lack of additional comprehensive studies on the syndication be-
haviour of European venture capitalists calls for further research in this ¯eld.
Recent literature refrains from transferring ¯ndings from the US VC industry
one-to-one to Europe and pays growing attention to the individual characteris-
tics of VC markets in di®erent regions [Jeng and Wells (2000)]. As Sapienza et
al. (1996) point out, there is a range of economic, legal, institutional and cultural
di®erences in°uencing the environment in which VC organisations operate. Thus,
the miscellaneous and comprehensive conclusions drawn on the North American
VC market are not necessarily applicable to the European VC industry. There-
fore, further comparisons on the syndication practices in Europe, the US and
Asia are needed and an interesting avenue for further research. Further studies
are also needed to reveal if the European VC industry is becoming more uniform
and standardised and to what degree trans-national syndicates have helped to
establish common norms and working methods. Also, the relationship between
syndication and ¯rm value of the investee company is far from being clari¯ed and
not even rudimentary researched for the European or even German VC market.
In the style of Maula and Murray (2000), "hard" data such as IPO valuations or
investment outcomes can possibly quantify the added value through syndication.
Finally, we want to stress the fact that more attention needs to be drawn to
the di±culties and potential downsides syndicated investments may yield. The
existing literature commonly discusses syndication in the light of the interest of
what kind of advantages it can bring to a VC investor. The overall impression
the existing studies and articles suggest is that syndication itself is a value, which
then can be explained by di®erent frameworks such as portfolio diversi¯cation or
value adding. However, little e®ort has been made to research in depth why most
VC investments are actually not syndicated. It is rather striking that there exists
no study revealing the reasons why venture capitalists refrain from syndicating
in or -out an investment and under which circumstances this is the case.
Overall, it can be concluded that our analysis yields valuable insights into the
38motives behind VC syndication and that based upon our research we might be
better able to understand in which cases it might be worthwhile to syndicate and
how syndication a®ects the constitution of the investment portfolio. Further-
more, it is the ¯rst study of its kind explicitly focusing on the German market
using actual outcome data. So far, the only two empirical studies on syndication
practice in Europe by Manigart et al. (2002) and Lockett and Wright (1999) are
wholly based on questionnaires. Another di®erence is that the sample does not
only contain transactions by professional VC organisations being members of the
BVK but also includes foreign investors, business angels, private- and one-time
VC investors which were found to play an important role in the VC ¯nancing of
German portfolio companies. This allows examining the whole spectrum of VC
investments in Germany and helps to reveal the actual co-investment behaviour
of the di®erent VC types in the industry. The results of this paper also reveal
some insights on the di®erences in the syndication behaviour of di®erent types of
VC investors that have not yet been discussed in the literature in this way and
might provide a starting point for further research.
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